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EASTTEXA.s HISTORICAL JOURNAL

CONFEDERATES AND COrTON IN EAST TEXAS
by Judy Gentry
The Union naval blockade of the Confederate coastline severely
disrupted existing marketing practices. Cotton producers east ofthe Brazos
found their efforts to market their crops disrupted by the unavailability of
shipping and the accelerating breakdown of the factorage system that had
served their needs since the 1830s. The Union blockade, distance from
the Mexican border and the main blockade--running port at Galveston,
and the unavailability of enough wagons and teams for overland transport
of crops kept the gold value of their cotton in the low range.
Government policies originating from the Confederate capital
in Virginia and implemented by the Confederate army also affected the
production and marketing of cotton in Texas east of the Brazos. The
Confederate Produce Loan in 1861, a government cotton purchasing
agent in 1863, Cotton Bureau policies in 1864 and early 1865, and in the
last few months of the war, new Confederate Treasury Department rules
greatly impacted the lives of cotton producers. Texas east of the Brazos
did not share in the large profits that cotton producers in western Texas
enjoyed during the war, but planters were able to survive economically
despite the blockade and despite the coerced sales ofhalftheir crops. Some
large planters successfulJy resisted both coerced sales and impressments,
thereby preserving their ability to benefit from the short-lived high prices
for cotton that prevailed in the third quarter of 1865.
Students of the Confederate Army's Trans-Mississippi Cotton
Bureau have generally concluded that the Bureau failed to achieve its
mission to acquire cotton to pay for imported supplies required by the
army. They have focused on the cotton that crossed the Rio Grande in
payment for supplies and concluded that only a small percentage of the
cotton that crossed the Rio Grande was government-owned. 1 This study
of Cotton Bureau actions east of the Brazos demonstrates the complexity
of Cotton Bureau success in utilizing cotton in support of the war effort.
Some of the cotton was indeed sent across the Rio Grande, but, in an
Judy Gentry is Professor 0/ History at the University of Louisiana
at Lafayette. She is the past preSident of the Southern Asssociation for
W0men Historians and the Louisiana Historical Association. Her most recent
publication is as co-editor with Janet Allured of Louisiana Women: Their
Lives and Times from the University ofGeorgia Press.
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effon ro ree tabli h the governmenr's credit, mo t of the governmenrowned corron in Texas ea t of the Brazo wa paid in eastern Texas ro
firm that had delivered good ro
onfederate military official in
advance of payment. Another large portion wenr ro Housron ro purchase
upplie run in through the blockade or to be exported ro England ro pay
Confederate debts and build a fund for further purchasing. All the corron
acquired by the Corron Bureau was u ed for the needs of the Confederate
army, but Iitrle of it reached the Rio Grande a army property. This
study al 0 throws Iighr on a econd i ue about the Co([on Bureau thar
ha been conrrover ial: To what extent did the Co([on Bureau impress
(commandeer) cotron for government use, when farmer and planrer
refused ro sell for the price the Bureau offered? The evidence is very
trong that in this region almost all producers sold rile Bureau half their
o([on because Cotron Bureau agents threatened to impre all of their
co([on if they would not ell half, but no actual impre sments of co([on
rook place.
rudent of the private cotron trade or the governmenr acqui ition
of cotron in Texa have traditionally looked at the Rio Grande area
from Brownsville to Eagle Pas. They have al 0 studied the transport of
COtron ourhward from an Anronio and Alleyron (below Housron)' the
conflict between Texas Governor Pendleton Murrah and the Confederate
Commander of the Trans-Missi ippi Deparrmenr Edmund Kirby mith·
the effort of the Texas government to acquire and rran port co([on in
we tern Texas; and me political respon in Texas ro Confederate cotron
policies. Other than one small book rhat focu ed on one Confederate
quarterma ter operating in the northeastern rno t part ofTexa , hi rorian
have rotally ignored operations of the TMD Cotton Bureau ea t of the
Brazo River. 2
Texa Civil War hisrorians have long lamenred the lack of attention
ro the economic hi rory ofTexas e pecially it agricultural aspects, but few
scholars have re ponded ro the challenge. Hi torian of agriculture have
especially neglected the marketing of cotton. Morton Rothstein poinred
our in 1970 that few studie addressed the "transportation marketing, or
banking relation hip to corron culture" in me nineteenth-century outh.
Again few have re ponded. As recently at 2003, Gavin Wrighr included
governmenr regulations of agricultural marketing among sadly neglected
topics in agricultural hi tory. Harold D. Woodman's path breaking study
of cotton factor limit hi di cu ion of Civil War cotton marketing in
the Trans-Missi ippi area almo t exclu ively to New Orleans. In 1965
Paul Gates-anomer of the few exceptions-devoted one-third of hi
21
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highly respected Agriculture during the Civil war to the South, but two of
his main conclusions-that the war devastated the South and that King
Corn displaced King Cotton during the war years-do not appear to be
accurate for Texas. Richard Lowe and Randolph Campbell's 1983 Planters
and Plain Folk added considerably to our understanding of antebellum
Texas agriculture but lacked a discussion of marketing networks. John
Solomon Otto's short 1995 book on southern agriculture, 1860-1880,
does address marketing as well as government agricultural policies
during the Civil War, but mentions Texas only in his closing chapter.]
This study's focus on the impact of government cotton policy in a major
cOHon-producing area ofTexas--the area east of the Brazos River~-where
the Union naval blockade had severely disrupted marketing practices
contributes to our understanding of the Texas economy during the Civil War.
An outline of the major events is useful. Many cotton producers
east of the Brazos patriotically pledged to lend part of the proceeds of
the sales of their 1861 crop to the Confederate government, but when it
came time to market their crop they found that the blockade prevented
exports and had depressed cotton prices well below pre-war levels.
Neither factors, other private buyers, nor government purchasing agents,
were interested in buying their cotton until the winter of 1862-1863,
and then only in the westernmost parts of the region. Cotton could only
reach Galveston to run the blockade or the Rio Grande to cross into
Mexico by wagon transport, and [here were too few wagons, teams, and
drivers. Finally, when all the cotton of western Texas had been exported,
private buyers and Cotton Bureau agents competed to buy cotton farther
and farther east. By 1864, the Bureau required all owners of cotton in
Texas (0 sell half to the government, and almost all producers east of the
Brazos complied with the requirement. They then could sell the rest to
private buyers or hold it until after the war ended, when they expected the
blockade to end and cotton prices to rise.
For at least the first eighteen months of the war, cotton traders in
Texas acquired cotton only west of the Brazos and transported it to the
Rio Grande for export. Texans, Mexicans, and some others attempted
to export cotton across the Rio Grande because the Union blockade of
the Confederate coastline made exports from seaports risky. The blockade
created a shortage of cotton and high cotton prices in Europe and in the
North, as well as a surplus of cotton and low cotton prices inside the
Confederacy. Overall, the Union blockade of Confederate POftS reduced
the commerce into and out of the Confederacy to about 1 percent of
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the pre-war trade. Although many vessels entered and left Confederate
POrtS during the first year or twO of the blockade, these were small vessels
with limited cargo space. The large sailing vessels that had carried conon
to England, Europe, and New England could not get insurance to run
the blockade and abandoned the trade for the duration of the war.
Confederatc army officers, in their official capacities, began to purchase
cotton in western Texas with quartermaster and ordnance funds for
transport to the Rio Grande where it would pay for arms, ammunition,
and quartermaster stores available there. 4
Conon producers east of the Brazos found the markering and
transporting of the fall 186 J crop (which would normally would have been
exported during the winter and spring of 1861-1862) disrupted by the
unavailability of shipping and the accelerated breakdown of the factorage
system that had served their needs since the 1830s. Most plantations were
located on or near navigable rivers and, before the war, transported their
crop on steamboats to the coast where it was loaded in small vessels, which
carried ir to Galveston or New Orleans. Some conan went by wagon
short distances to rail heads that connected to Shreveport or Houston
for forwarding to New Orleans or Galveston. The blockade closed these
routes. The high cost of transporting cotton the long distances from
northern or eastern Texas to the Rio Grande discouraged exports from
the atea so much that conan prices remained low there, and the 1861
crop remained, for the most part, where it had been grown, harvested,
ginned, and perhaps baled. The well-established marketing patterns had
been disrupted. 5
1he Confederate government in 1861 urged planters throughout
the Confederacy to subscribe to a Produce Loan, pledging to lend the
government part of the proceeds of their crop. The Confederate Treasury
Depanment intended to use rhe loan's certificates as security for borrowing
in England or France pounds or francs to purchase supplies ro be run in
through the blockade. However, the large ships, which left in May 1861
with remnants of the 1860 crop did not return until the blockade was
lifted four years later. Southern debtors refused to reimburse Northern
creditors until the war ended, causing Northern credit, which was
essential for factors to conduct their business, dried up. Corton factors
soon understood that only small amounts of canon would get through the
blockade and that the POrt warehouses would overAow. The New Orleans
cotton factors placed a notice in the newspapers, to the effect that they
would not accept conan shipments that they could neither ship nor store.
23
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This decision affected part of the crop in east Texas that previously had
been marketed through Shreveport, Louisiana to New Orleans factors.
More importantly, all factors in the major Confederate seaports faced the
same problems as their New Orleans colleagues. When export proved
to be almost impossible, the Confederate government accepted in the
summer of 1862 the cotton itselfin return for Produce Loan bonds; when
necessary, it would pay for up to half of the cotton in Confederate
currency rather than in bonds. Some Texas planters subscribed to the
Produce Loan, giving the Confederate government ownership of 25 % to
100 % oftheir crop; this cotton remained on the plantations and eventually
became the security for a major bond issue in Europe that raised over $8
million (specie value) for the Confederacy. Produce Loan records show
that producers in Texas, mostly east of the Brazos, subscribed over 14,000
bales of cotton. The producers were paid primarily in Confederate bonds
that promised 8 percent interest twice a year in specie. (The government,
however, actually paid the interest in Confederate notes.) Some producers
may have demanded and received partial payment in cash instead of
bonds. In mid-1862, it took $1.50 Confederate dollars to equal $1.00 in
gold; by micl-1863 it took $9.00. Mter the fall of Vicksburg in July 1863
cut the Trans-Mississippi off from the Confederacy east of the river, it is
unlikely that enough Confederate currency reached the TMD to pay this
interest. Nevertheless, the interest payments to bondholders may have
provided a small income from mid-1862 through mid-1863. Those who
got some of their subscription in Confederate dollars could have spent
them in 1862 without much loss, but would have lost five-sixths of their
value if they held them until 1863. 6
At cotton planting time in early spring 1862, Confederate hopes
for a quick victory were still high. Many cotton planters optimistically
planted a full crop, or nearly so, with perhaps more acreage than usual
devoted to food crops. After the Confederacy quickly won the war, it would
be good to have a large crop growing in the fields. The Confederate defeat
at Shiloh in April and the fall of New Orleans in May came after planting.
In April 1862 the Confederacy began conscripting young white men who
had not volunteered for military service. The small family farms east of
the Brazos, which produced about 20 percent of the total cotton crop, lost
virtually their entire labor force. Some enrolled in the Texas militia but
were soon sent to the western frontier; others avoided the Confederate
troops that hunted down draft evaders~ but few were able to continue
their normal labor. The production of cotton and food crops by small
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farms necessarily declined. During 1862, rhe Confederare government
was increasingly unable ro meet rhe army's needs. In Texas, as well as in
rhe entire Confederacy. milirary commanders shorr offood, draft animals,
wagons, and forage aurhorized impressmenr from the local population. Ir
had long been rhe practice of Europe and rhe Unired Srares ro aurhorize
impressments necessary ro keep an army funcrioning. Officers supervised
the seizures and gave derailed receiprs. Impressment of drafr animals and
wagons inrerfered wirh rhe moving of corron ro marker.]
Because of rheir disrance from rhe Mexican border and from rhe
main blockade-running porr ar Galvesron. producers easr of rhe Brazos
found rhar rhe gold value of rheir corron remained in rhe low range
(in comparison ro 1860 prices) rhroughour rhe war excepr for a shorrlived rise in 1863. In November 1862, rhe Confederare aurhoriries in
Richmond arrempred ro prevent comperirion among quarrermasrers in
Texas by appointing Major Simeon Harr. an EI Paso merchant, as rhe only
quarrermasrer in Texas aurhorized ro imporr supplies and acquire and
rransporr corron ro rhe Rio Grande ro pay for rhem. By rhe rime Harr
rook charge. corron prices in wesrern Texas were so high rhar he used mosr
of his Iimired fund of Con federare currency ro purchase corron in easrern
Texas. Some businessmen also began ro buy corron in rhe area, causing
real (gold equivalent) corron prices ro rise. Harr srruggled for rhe nexr year
and a half ro move rhar corron ro rhe Rio Grande. Small amountS reached
rhe Rio Grande border in rhe summer of 1863, bur some of his Easr Texas
corron was still on rhe plantarions in rhe summer of 1864'
Because Han's corron would nor be available soon enough, Kirby
Smirh creared in Augusr 1863 a Trans-Mississippi Deparrment Corron
Bureau ro acquire corron ro pay for imporred supplies arriving in Mexico.
Colonel William A. Broadwell, a prominent New Orleans corron facror,
headed rhe new agency, and by November 1863, Lr. Col. William J.
Hurchins headed a sub-unir. rhe Texas Corron Office. Hurchins' charge
was ro acquire corron in wesrern Texas for forwarding ro rhe Rio Grande.
He was also ro buy corron near Housron ro pay for supplies arriving ar
Galvesron rhrough rhe blockade or ro send ro rhe Rio Grande. To avoid
impressmenr of all of a producer's corron crop. he had ro sell half ro rhe
government and deliver ir ro Corron Bureau depors. To a large exrenr, rhe
Bureau acquired corron under rhis plan only near Housron or in rhe area
between rhe Brazos and Trinity rivers.'
1he army quanermasrers were busy in lare 1863, serring up depors
ro collecr a rax-in-kind rhe Confederare Congress had passed in April.
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By October 1, 1863, agricultural producers had to pay ten percent of
the 1861 and 1862 crops nor yet sold, and by February 1864, they owed
ten percent of their entire 1863 crop. The tax applied to virtuaJly all
agricultural products, including cotton. For goods aJready impressed or
sold to the government, the tax was ten percent of the sale or impressments
price. Congress later extended this "tithe" to the 1864 and 1865 crops.
The dried peas, grains, hay, and bacon were consumed by the troops
nearby. Quartermasters delivered the cotton to Treasury agents, who at
first held it as security for potential foreign loans but later exported some
to England to buy supplies. The farmers and planters apparently did not
have to provide an additional ten percent of their cotton after selling half
to the Conon Bureau. 1o
Unlike cotton growers elsewhere in the Confederacy, Texas cotton
producers never experienced occupation by Union troops during the war.
Their slaves may have known about the Emancipation Proclamation but
had no opportunity to escape to Union lines. Their masters knew better
than to send them near the Mexican border, where they could easily slip
to freedom across the Rio Grande. The Confederate armies sometimes
impressed slave labor, and slaves sometimes acted as teamsters hauling
government cotton. Because fewer white men supervised their labor on
plantations, the slaves could slack off in their work. They experienced
deprivation, since planters could not import cloth, clothing, and shoes
for their use. Since the Texas antebellum planters generally produced all
the food needed for their families, laborers, and animals, slaves probably
did not see a decline in their diet. All in all, Texas planters encountered
far fewer problems controlling their slaves than those in other parts of
the Confederacy. The war only minimally affected cotton production of
plantations east of the Brazos. 11
Texas planters also enjoyed at least the possibility of selling their
cotton for export across the Rio Grande. Consequently, producers in
western Texas experienced rising prices for their cotton as businessmen,
state agents, army quartermasters, and eventually the Cotton Bureau
competed to buy their crop. By 1863, that competition for cotton
reached the area between the Trinity and Brazos rivers, and by early 1864
it had penetrated even east of the Trinity, where the prices were limited,
however, by the costs of transporting cotton greater distances.
After the fall of Vicksburg, Kirby Smith ordered the removal
of government-owned cotton (mainly Produce Loan cotton near the
Mississippi River) to safety farther west. As Produce Loan agent and
26
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then Cotton Bureau agent, Andrew W. McKee worked from July until
the end of December 1863, moving 3,600 bales of government cOtton
from Louisiana south of the Red River to Niblett's Bluff on the Sabine
River. Captains W. W Barrett and Noble A. Birge, Cotton Bureau agents,
hauled 7,000 additional bales from Louisiana ro the Sabine River from
August through December 1863. They also transported cotton from
northwestern Louisiana or points on the Sabine River by wagon rrain
to Waco for evenrual shipment to the Rio Grande. Barrett and Birge
were exrremely efficient ar hiring drivers with their teams and wagons,
organizing rrains, repairing wagons, managing the livestock, selecting
routes with adequare forage, and personally supervising rhe rrains en
route. Within a few months they had 350 loaded wagons on the road to
Waco. The wagons returned to departmental headquarters at Shreveport,
Louisiana with quartermasrer, ordnance, and medical srores imported
across the Rio Grande. These wagon trains made regular round trips,
except when diverted for other military purposes. By November 1864,
Barrett and Birge's trains had hauled 6600 bales to Waco or San Antonio,
had 965 bales on wheels to those places, and had delivered almost 1100
bales of cotton to other depots-for a total of 8,660 bales transported
westward through Texas east of the Brazos."
The Cotton Bureau also arranged to move cotton from farther east
in Louisiana to Pulaski, Burr's Ferry, and Sabinetown on the Sabine River.
Broadwell then contracted with Moore and Smoker, and later Davenport
and Burns, Caprain B. H. Perry, and Captain J. W. Polk, to build sheds to
prorecr the merchandise on the Sabine, build Aatboats, put the cotton in
order (it suffered from deteriorating bagging and rope and lack of shelter
during transport and to some extent while on the plantations), and at
the first rise of the river to ship ir to Orange, Texas. From there it could
be shipped by steamboat and then rail ro Housron or even southwest of
Houston to Alleyton, a depor for wagon trains to Brownsville on the Rio
Grande. Altogether 12-14,000 bales of cotton accumulated at the Sabine
River from Louisiana or nearby areas of Texas, on their way to Houston
and beyond. Minimal rises of rhe Sabine River in rhe drought of 18631864 delayed shipping. Orher delays included the need to buy cotton
presses and import bagging and rope to put the cotton into good order,
rhe need to load it on steamers or wagons ar Orange for rransport to the
railhead ar Beaumont, and the paucity of labor available to accomplish
these tasks. The firsr Sabine cotton arrived at Orange in July 1864, and
some was still at Pulaski when the war ended. Some reached Houston
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by rail in the late winter and spring of 1865 and some was delivered at
Sabinetown in payment on a huge debt owed to R. King & Company.l3
Although the agents and government contractors had many advantages,
including freedom from impressments of their equipment or transport and
an occasional work detail from the military, moving fewer than 14,000
bales of cotton overland to the Sabine River and then to the railhead at
Beaumont highlight the difficulties private businessmen and producers
encountered in moving cotton to market.
Once established in August 1863, the Cotton Bureau took over
existing government cotton contracts and cotton operations, most of
them in Texas west of the Brazos or near Houston. By November
Hutchin's Texas Cotton Office expanded the purchasing effort to east of
the Brazos. The TCO directly administered the area between the Brazos
and Trinity Rivers, the area surrounding Houston, and an area eastward
along the coast to the Sabine. The TCO area to the east of Houston
extended northward about 90 miles on the Sabine River end and about
125 miles northward on the Trinity River end, encompassing Orange and
Beaumont in the southeast and Crockett in its northwestern corner. Soon
the TeO estabJished major depots at Waco, Marlin, and Mosely's Ferry
on the upper Brazos River, and Navasota, Magnolia, and others between
the Brazos and Trinity rivers north and northwest of Houston. 14
In January of 1864, the TMD Cotton Bureau required planters
to sell half their cotton to the Confederate government or have all of
it seized. Broadwell directed Barrett and Birge to purchase cotton in a
large area of northern and eastern Texas-north and east of a line drawn
diagonally along the eastern boundary of Anderson County, to Dallas
County at the northwestern end and Sabine County at the southeastern.
The western boundary of the area bordered on the upper Trinity River,
and the southern bounds met the TCO-administered area that stretched
eastward along the Gulf Coast. Barrett established his headquarters at
Henderson and Birge operated from Jefferson. They attempted to buy
half the cotton of their districts. They could offer the schedule price
for half, and exemptions from impressments for the rest if the producers
hauled the government half to depots within twenty-five miles of their
plantation. For permits to export their half, producers had to deliver the
Cotton Bureau's half the longer distances to Marlin on the upper Brazos
River or Magnolia (nearer to Houston), for instance. Barrett and Birge
were only minimally successful until the system was reformed five months
later. Five factors limited their success. Entrepreneurs who had previously
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confined their activities to western Texas began buying corton during the
winter of 1862-1863 not only between the Brazos and Trinity rivers but
also in the western pans of Barrerr's and Birge's districts, pushing prices
up. From early 1864 to the end of the war, Governor Henry W. Allen
of Louisiana employed agents to buy corron in Louisiana and northeast
Texas and move it to Waco and then through San Antonio to rhe Rio
Grande. 1here, his agents exchanged it for medicine, corron cards for the
hand manufacmre of cloth, and other civilian necessities. Allen's operation
seldom came into conflict with Corron Bureau agents, and when it did,
Broadwell quickly negotiated mutually acceptable solutions. More
importandy, by March 1864, Texas government agents offered growers
who sold corron to the state protection from impressment for an
amount equal ro the amount sold to the state. State agents offered higher
prices than the Corron Bureau. They also claimed that the Corron
Bureau was nor legally authorized to impress corton and denounced its
agents as corrupt. Most planters therefore preferred to sell to the state.
A fourth factor was a February 1864 law of the Confederate Congress
that transferred control of corron exports to the Treasury Department.
But, a key reason rhe Corron Bureau's January 1864 plan f.1iled was the
simple fact that growers did not have the teams and wagons ro transport
more than a few bales, and the January 1864 Bureau plan relied on
producers to take the initiative to deliver the corron to get exemptions
from impressments and export permits. IS
In June 1864, Broadwell and Kirby Smith designed a new plan
for acquiring corron and by early July Governor Murrah agreed to no
longer oppose the Bureau corron purchasing program. Again, the threat of
impressments was at rhe hearr of rhe plan. Corton Bureau agents visited
evety farm and plantation and offered to buy half the crop at the schedule
price in return for exemptions from impressments for d,e rest. An officer
with the authority to impress all their cotton visited producers who did
not sell half to the government. Usually, at that time, the producers
agreed to sell half to get the other half exempted. Everywhere eaSt of the
Brazos except in Barrerr and Birge's districts, producers also got export
permits for delivering the government bales to nearby depots. [n 1864,
corron with export permits sold for almost twice as much as other corron,
but permits were our of reach for most of the producers east of the Trinity
River. To obtain export permits for their half, they would have had to haul
the corron they sold to the Bureau from 120 ro 200 miles cross country
to points on the Brazos River or near Houston. The value of corron in
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these easternmost areas was only 2 to 3 cents (specie), because buyers
deducted the cost of transport to market. Broadwell used export permits
to encourage producers to bear the cost of transport at least as far as the
Brazos. Barrett and Birge proved unable to convince Broadwell that the
producers simply lacked the means to move their cotton that far. 16
Whereas almost all producers east of the Brazos sold half their
cotton to the Bureau, in several counties the largest owners refused to
sell even when the impressment officers arrived, claiming the Bureau
had no authority to impress cotton. Kirby Smith based his authority on
directives from the Secretary of War and President of the Confederacy
when the surrender at Vicksburg brought about a separation of the TransMississippi states from the Confederacy east of the Mississippi River.
They instructed Kirby Smith to exercise the civil and military authority
of the Confederate government in the Trans-Mississippi and do what
was necessary to supply the army in that area. In August 1863, TransMississippi governors agreed to cooperate with Kirby Smith and most
often did so. (The exception was Texas governor Pendleton Murrah, from
early March to early July 1864.) Kirby Smith also pointed out that the
Confederate Congress had confirmed that traditional military authority
for impressments. When in early August 1864, new regulations arrived
from Richmond with an order to turn control of cotton over to the TMD
Treasury agent, Kirby Smith convinced him that the Overland Regulations
were impractical and received permission to continue as before until
February L 1865. Cotton Bureau agents corresponded regarding the
desirability of impressing cotton. Most agreed that there was no way to
keep the army supplied without acquiring cotton and that the army had
no money to pay for cotton or supplies. Because of that necessity, many
believed it important to demonstrate the resolve of Kirby Smith and to
make an example of the few large planters who refused to sell. They
argued that fairness to the smaller planters and farmers who had sold
cotton to the Bureau required impressments. Others suggested that while
impressments of supplies was lawful, impressment of the wherewithal
to pay for imported supplies might not be. Since the Texas legislature
had passed laws requiring full payment at the time of impressment
and requiring Texas authorities to arrest anyone who attempted illegal
impressment, officers in the field tried to shift responsibility up the chain
of command but could not obtain a clear order to impress particular
cotton. The correspondence of the Cotton Bureau indicates that no
impressments of cotton took place in Texas east of the Brazos. I ?
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Allhough in January 1865 some large planrers successfully defied
COllon Bureau mreals 10 impress Iheir COllon, Ihe June 1864 program 10
coerce sales through Ihreals of impressmenr had made il possible for Ihe
Bureau 10 acquire nearly half Ihe COllon easl of Ihe Brazos. When Governor
Murrah agreed in July 1864 10 SlOp opposing Ihe Bureau purchasing
program and officers began arriving on farms and planralions ro impress
all of Ihe COllon of Ihose who were slow 10 sell, almosl all producers sold
half Iheir COllon 10 Ihe Bureau. The growers believed impressmenr was
imminenr and needed Ihe promised paymenl. Moreover, Ihose wesl of
Ihe Triniry River gOI permils 10 exporr Ihe Olher half. Even in Barrell and
Birge's disrricls, producers sold half 10 Ihe governmenr, in me hope Ihal
Ihe exemprions would allow [hem 10 sell Ihe resl. Privale buyers, some of
whom broughl wagons and Mexican drivers inro easlern Texas, could get
Ihe exporr permils for rhe other half (which increased its value
considerably) if they hauled Ihe governmenr half 10 the Brazos River. I.
Corron Bureau agenrs east of Ihe Brazos used Ihe large amounrs of
COllon Ihey purchased from June 1864 through January 1865 in various
ways. They rransporred some 10 Waco or San Anronio for reshipmenl 10
Ihe Rio Grande and some 10 Navasola (al rhe junclion of Ihe NavasalO
River wilh a shorr rail line 10 HouslOn) or Olher depOls for shipmenr ro
Housron, 10 pay for goods being run in Ihrough Ihe blockade al Galvesron.
HUlchin paid 13,700 bales of COllon al Houston, from July Ihrough
OClober 1864, for goods run in Ihrough GalveslOn, or ro credirors of
Ihe COlron Bureau. Afler Ihe lasl blockade-running porr on rhe easl
coaSI fell in mid-January 1865, Hutchins could exporrlarger amounrs of
COllon on blockade runners Ihal shifled Iheir operalions 10 GalveslOn.
This COllon was shipped 10 Havana, 10 pay credilOrs or 10 Liverpool for
sale on governmenr accounr. During Ihe lasl five monrhs of Ihe war, Ihe
Texas COllon Office exporred 7100 bales of COlron from GalveslOn on
governmenr accounl.'9
BUI most of Ihe COllon purchased by Ihe Bureau eaSI of me Brazos
appears 10 have been used ro pay for army SlOres delivered during Ihe
preceding !WO years. To improve governmenr credil, 10 mainrain Iheir
honor and rhe governmenr's, and 10 induce cOl1lraClOrs 10 conrinue
imporring army supplies, Broadwell and Kirby Smilh direcled rhar COllon
be paid 10 Bouldin and Newell, R. King and Company, Bouldin, Riggs
and Walker, Governor Morehead, and a few olhers who had delivered
supplies when needed insread of demanding paymenr before delivery. In
Ihe spring of 1865, Bouldin, Riggs and Walker was slill awailing paymenr
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for thirteen tons of lead delivered to the arsenal at Marshall in January
of 1864, and R. King and Company awaited payment for supplies
delivered in June 1864 and advances made to Broadwell at that time so
that the Cotton Bureau might sustain its cotton acquisition and transport
program. In some instances, the Bureau delivered cotton to contractors
at depots east of the Brazos, Eventually, the Bureau transferred to King
and Company, and others to whom cotton was owed, the government
half of the cotton of entire counties where it lay on the plantations. The
contractors' agents then took possession of the cotton directly from the
producers and attempted to transport it to the Rio Grande or run it out
through the blockade at Galveston or the mouth of the Sabine River. 20
Few buyers in Barrett and Birge's districts, however, could obtain
Cotton Bureau export permits, because most did not have wagons and
teams to deliver cotton to the Brazos River. Those who wished to sell
rheir cotton could sell it [0 private buyers who brought teams and wagons
into the district. Generally, private buyers paid in Confederate currency
equivalent to the specie value. Thus, if Broadwell's upper estimate that
cotton in Barrett and Birge~s districts was worth 3 cents per pound (specie)
was correct, the buyers would pay 60 cents per pound in Confederate
dollars in July 1864. The Bureau, on the other hand, paid a set prke, 20
cents per pound in early 1864 (and 25 cents in late 1864) in certificates
that could be exchanged for Confederate dollars when the currency
became available and, moreover, was dilatory in providing certificates.
Bureau buying of cotton and issuing of exemptions and export permits
ended February L 1865. 21
Through coerced sales, the Bureau~s effective cotton-buying
program in Texas east of the Brazos - under the authority of Kirby Smith as
Commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department -lasted seven months.
In that time, it had acquired nearly half the cotton of the area for the use
of the Confederate Army,
Congress's February 1864 law mandated that importers and
exporters make available to the government half of their cargo space and
effectively transferred control of cotron exports from the army to the
Treasury Department. Treasury Department regulations under the new
law envisioned exporting to England half rhe cotton of the Confederacy
and prohibited both paymenr in cotton for purchases of supplies in
the Confederacy and contracts providing for payments in cotton in the
Confederacy for imported supplies. All cotton would go to England to
purchase supplies there at wholesale prices. The Treasury Deparrment
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planned to acquire Catton from exponers at the pons (and, in Texas, also
at Alleytown and Waco), since the exponers could ship Catton only ifhalf
the cargo wa government owned. 22
The Treasury Depanment developed regulations for exportS by sea
and by overland transpon in April 1864. They reached Kirby Smith in
early August 1864. Peter W. Gray, former Confederate Senator from Texas,
had become the Treasury agent for the Trans-Mississippi Depanment in
February and soon established his headquarters at Marshall, Texas. When
Kirby Smith and Broadwell pointed Out ro him the impracticality of the
overland regulations, Gray allowed Cotton Bureau operations to continue
while he requested modification. He allowed the Cotton Bureau to buy
and transport catton, and issue exemptions and export permits until
February I, 1865. The Cotton Bureau and those with expon permits could
continue to expon catton without Treasury Depanment interference until
May I. From early August on, however, Gray refused to provide any new
issue Confederate dollars for Catton buying and directed that payment
be made in certificares, or old issue currency that the Cotton Bureau
might have on hand. When the modified regulations arrived in early
October 1864, Gray published them bur did nat gain control of Cotton
Bureau staff until mid-November. Gray slowly familiarized himself
with the practices of the Bureau and in the meantime allowed the June
1864 plan to continue for the overland trade. By December 1864, Gray
regretted having agreed to the permits for export and indirectly approving
impressments. In early January, Gray published a notice that he had never
approved impressments of cotton, and soon after, Kirby Smith withdrew
his authority for impressments of COlton, thus undercutting the threat of
impressment that was at the heart of the June 1864 program. But by that
time, the Colton Bureau had already acquired a large pan of the Catton
of the region. 13
Although the June 1864 Cotton Bureau program had been in effect
for seven months, for the last three and a half momhs of the war the threat
of impressments was gone. Cotton producers could freely sell colton they
had not previously sold. The buyers would then attempt to transpon it
to the Mexican border or Galvesron. In either case, buyers intending to
expon catron eventually would have to sell half to the government because
half rhe cargos leaving the Confederacy had to be government-owned.
Similarly, wagon trains carrying cotton past Alleyton or Waco toward the
Rio Grande had to provide half the cargo space to the government, so
the traders had to sell to the government half of their stock. Given the
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time it took for wagon trains to move cotton from northern and eastern
Texas, few if any cotton buyers were able to export cotton from east of
the Brazos under the Treasury Department plan. An unexpected obstade
appeared when the drought that had plagued Texas since early 1864 broke
with drenching rains in the winter of 1864-1865 and spring of 1865,
producing mud that bogged down wagon trains across the state. 24
By late 1864, realizing that the Confederacy had lost the war,
some planters became unwilling to sell to private buyers at any price)
expecting lifting of the blockade and reopening of the traditional routes.
They hoped that the specie price of cotton would then rise considerably.
At the time of the surrender, much cotton remained on the plantations.
Indeed, many factorage firms returned to business soon after the war
ended and exported large amounts of cotton in late 1865 and early 1866.
The specie price of cotton at Galveston in the summer of 1865 was 50
cents, more than seventeen times the price east of the Brazos during most
of the war. Although the price at Galveston quickly feU to a high of 3132 cents during 1866 (the 1865 crop marketing year), that was ten times
the price that Texans east of the Brazos could get during the war and five
rimes the usual pre-war price. 2S
Texas east of the Brazos did not share in the large profits that
cotton producers in western Texas enjoyed during the war, but the
planters survived economically despite the blockade and the coerced sales.
Although for thirteen months Oanuary 1864 through January 1865),
cotton producers faced government policies that demanded that they
sell half their cotton or have all of it impressed, producers could, after
complying, then sell the other half at higher prices, since it was exempt
from impressments. Some major producers apparently successfully held
out against this government coercion and probably sold their cotton to
private buyers during the summer or fall of 1865, taking advantage of
much higher prices once the blockade was lifted.
~

This study illuminates two important aspects of the economy ofTexas east
of the Brazos River during the Civil War: the economic lives of cotton
producers, as the Union blockade disrupted well-established marketing
arrangements for cotton; and the Confederate Cotton Bureau's efforts to
acquire half the cotton of Texas.
After the people of eastern Texas found it almost impossible to
export or sell their cotton during the first year and a half of the war,
the revised Produce Loan provided a little relief in late 1862, and some
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buyers appeared in the western part of the area in 1863. In early 1864,
the demands of the Confederate Corron Bureau that they sell half their
corron at low prices or have the entirety impressed dashed local hopes
to sell corron at good prices. Private buyets in some areas paid higher
prices for the other half but struggled ro get permits ro export it. By
late 1864, many producers preferred ro hold their half in anticipation of
higher prices after the war was over. It was not until the war ended, the
army disbanded, and the blockade was lifted that corron marketing could
hope ro return ro the pre-war routes and practices.
11,e TM D Corron Bureau was successful in the last year of the war
in acquiring in eastern Texas latge amounts of corron to pay for military
goods imporred inro Texas. This success was based on coercion by threats
of impressing all of a producer's cotron if he or she would not sell half
ro the army. As a few inAuential Texans refused ro comply and a much
larger number protested ro the state legislature and Confederate Congress,
Kirby Smith withdrew his authorization for impressing corron. The army,
however, required the overwhelming majority of producers who had
Signed contracts under that threat ro deliver their cotron as conrracted.
Clearly, if the war had continued for another year, the unwillingness of
Texas citizens ro sell corron at low prices to the Confederate army would
have prevented the army from continuing ro import essential militaty supplies.
This study also demonstrates the compleXity of the Confederate
use of corton ro pay for imported goods. The Confederate Treasury
Department u ed Produce Loan corron where it lay on the producer's
land as security for borrowing in England and Europe. The Confederate
Army in Texas paid corron on delivery of imported goods on the Rio
Grande and at Galvesron, delivered corton at depots along the Brazo
River ro contracrors who had delivered goods in advance of payment,
and delivered half the corron of entire counties ro contracrors who had
advanced huge sums of money ro the Cotron Bureau. Finally, in 1864
Confederate Treasury agents exported large amounts ofcorron for sale in England.
11,e Confederate army in Texas increasingly undersrood the
importance of cotron in its ability ro protect Texas from Union forces.
11,e inability of producers of corron in Texas east of the Brazos to export
or sell their corron eliminated their main source of income. The resulting
tension was one example of a weakening of support for continuing the
war that was evident by late 1864 in most pam of the Confederacy.
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